Tuesday, 29 November 2016

The Grand Renaissance Dam – A Unifier or a Divider?


The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is the latest major development project “blessing” the African continent and now completed is the largest hydroelectric dam on the continent. It began being built in 2011 on the River Nile near the Sudan border. The dam is set to flood 1680 square kilometres of forest in North West Ethiopia and create a reservoir that will hold around 70 billion cubic metres of water (Veilleux, 2013). The project’s projected electricity capacity is 6,000 MW and is seen to be the answer to Ethiopia’s growing demand for energy as economic growth and a better quality of life prevails. Nevertheless, it has also faced the wrath of Egypt and their concern that upstream manipulation of the water will diminish their “lions-share” of the river that they are entitled to according to 20th century treaties. The thoughts of local Egyptians regarding the GERD construction is demonstrated in a video in my previous blog. 




Although the GERD (pictured above) is a symbol that Africa is developing and highlights a historic moment in Ethiopian history is has caused major unrest between Egypt and Ethiopia and to an extent Sudan. Ethiopia argued that its contribution to around 85% of the Nile’s waters gives it the right to build this dam for the good of its country and future sustainability of water and food sources. Despite huge unrest, Egypt, which relies almost exclusively on the Nile for farming, industry and domestic water use, has been assured that the GERD will not meaningfully cut the flow of water to its rapidly ballooning population. This was the basis upon which Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia co-operated by signing an agreement which included giving priority to downstream countries for electricity generated by the dam.

An agreement between these 3 riparians looked far off when Ethiopia first announced their project and Egypt prime minister backlashed angrily by stating “If our share of Nile water decreases, our blood will be the alternative”. At this stage a water war looked far more likely than an agreement and Abdul Jameel of the World Water and Food Security Lab was concerned about the lack of cooperation between riparian states on the Nile Basin and a potential water war forming. His fears regarding the implementation of 2 major dams on an international river without the necessary agreements and cooperation required are, in my opinion, justified.

“We are aware of no situation comparable to that which will be realized in the near future in the Nile, wherein two storage facilities that are so large relative to the annual flow of an international river will coexist without some institutional agreement in place” (Jameel, 2015).

With Africa being a very vulnerable continent as it is, further conflict and a lack of unification could and would affect the development of the least developed continent on Earth. In this regard the signing of the agreement "declaration of principles" in 2015 between the 3 countries came as a relief and also a stepping stone to perhaps further unification in the world’s most controversial river basin.
Although Egypt has recently adopted a less dominant and possessive stance in relation to their “source of life” – The Nile – fears regarding future water scarcity for a population not only growing but also 100% dependent on the Nile have not been alleviated. Regardless of negotiations Egypt will still be unable to meet its future water needs. It must take steps now to reduce its domestic water usage regardless of the negotiation’s outcome (Mason, 2005). I will be looking at what Egypt could potentially do in terms of supply-side management and demand –side management to avoid insecurity fears and a lack of food in future posts.


It has always been a national priority for Egypt to avoid water shortages. "The first consideration of any Egyptian government is to guarantee that Nile waters are not threatened" (Heikal, 1978). On the other hand one can argue the case for Ethiopia wanting create some security for itself by implementing a dam which will ensure a steady water supply for years to come. So, to what extent do riparian states look to co-operate and what is the best way to ensure fair access for all states? I believe that increased co-operation has been evident in the last couple of decades and at the same time we have seen development take place at a greater rate. “By coming together to jointly manage their shared water resources, countries build trust and prevent conflict” (Kameri-Mbote, 2007). Yes, agreement and unification is definitely necessary in the basin to achieve sustainable development and avert water and food insecurity issues but this isn’t enough. Talking about the aforementioned Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and its positive effects, Mbote states, “However, high-level negotiations like the NBI are not enough; civil society must be involved”.  Involving stakeholders to ensure no conflict and enhance the efficiency of the basin is paramount and I believe that the recent co-operation in the basin is necessary going forward. However, it remains to be seen whether 1) Ethiopia will compromise Egypt’s access to water 2) Africa’s hydro political stance has shifted from unilateral to co-operation. One thing is for sure – Egypt’s dominant reign over the basin is now over as the African paradigm shifts yet again.


References
Cascão, A.E. (2009) Changing power relations in the Nile river basin: Unilateralism vs. Cooperation? Available at: http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/allabs/52-a2-2-5/file
Jameel, A. (2014) The grand Ethiopian renaissance dam: An opportunity for collaboration and shared benefits in the eastern Nile basin. Available at: 
Kameri-Mbote, P. (2007) Water, confliCt, and cooperation: Lessons from the nile river basin. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/NavigatingPeaceIssuePKM.pdf
Mason, S.A. (2005) From conflict to cooperation in the Nile basin. Available at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/From_Conflict_to_Cooperation.pdf
Veilleux, J.C. (2013) The human security dimensions of dam development: The grand Ethiopian renaissance dam. Available at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/publications/Veilleux_GLOBAL%20DIALOGUE_V15_GERD.pdf.


Monday, 28 November 2016

A Taste of Things to Come...

The wait for the next part of my case study is almost over. Whilst you restlessly wait I have found a short video clip surrounding the Egypt and Ethiopia conflict on the Nile Basin. It is interesting to see what the locals have to say about the matter and how it will affect their personal lives.

Just a little food for thought...


Thursday, 24 November 2016

The Nile River Basin : A Tilt in Power ?

Part I 

In the first of this 2-part case study I will introduce the fastest growing river basin in the world and how it’s diminishing resources are putting a strain on inter-state politics and food security. In the second part I will delve deeper into particular developmental projects in Africa and the repercussions for the geo-political landscape of the basin.

Having outlined the ongoing water scarcity problems surrounding Africa in previous posts it may come as a surprise to some that the world’s longest river runs through the core of continent. The River Nile basin has a population of 225 million (UNEP, 2011) and is home to 3 of the most heavily concentrated populations in Africa – Lake Victoria, Egypt and the Ethiopian Highlands. With water being such a precious commodity and 11 countries situated along it’s river basin - all with high demographic and economic growth rates- the River Nile is the cause of increasing conflict.



Egypt accounts for 9% of the basin’s area but holds one third of the basin’s booming population whilst Sudan accounts for a colossal 65% of the basin but only holds half of the population that Egypt does (Ciesen, 2010). This begs the question - who has the right to more of this precious resource? – the countries which are home to most of the basin’s population or the basin’s total coverage or should all riparian’s have equal access?

As a result of being such a vast body, the Nile covers a variety of climates which face different annual precipitation and evapotranspiration rates. As a result, some nations rely on the Nile more than others…

As can be seen from the above picture, The Nile basin, including its main tributaries -the White Nile and the Blue Nile - is shared by eleven countries - Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Hence, the Nile has become emblematic of trans boundary water disputes pitting upstream development ambitions against downstream fears of water security. A changing balance in power between riparian states is shaping current developments. Historically Egypt, the country furthest downstream, has occupied a dominant position within the Nile basin. It was able to secure most of the Nile’s water and heavily tap the river’s resources in order to develop its agriculture and industry via a 1929 treaty. Over the last few decades however, upstream riparian’s have experienced considerable economic growth and political consolidation which has brought them into a position where they can challenge Egypt’s hegemonic status. One country which has particularly prevailed in this regard is Ethiopia, the source to some 85% of the River Nile’s total water. Facing improved opportunities to harness their water resources, but also an increase in demand for energy and arable surfaces in the wake of mushrooming populations, upstream countries have embarked upon ambitious development projects along the Nile much to the anger of Egypt who fear a decrease in downstream river flows; sparking mass water and food security issues.

As mentioned earlier, a 1929 treaty was signed by Great Britain and 10 East African colonies as a guideline for how much water each country owned. The treaty stated Egypt owned 80% of the water and Sudan owned 10% which was one day bound to be contested by other nations- especially Ethiopia which contributes over half of the Nile’s water. Fast forward a few decades and countries such as Ethiopia experienced a sudden boom in their economy resulting in a significant increase in the demand for water (Picket, 1991). El Fadel (2003) concurred by suggesting rising populations and limited resources were increasing tensions in the basin and that every nation had their own economic ambitions and future aspirations. As such countries began to stand up to “bully’ Egypt and grew tired of first getting permission from Egypt before using river Nile water for any development project like irrigation, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was formed.  Seeking a mutually acceptable basis for cooperation in the Nile basin, the riparians established the NBI in 1999, an interstate partnership with the objective of developing 'the river in a cooperative manner, sharing substantial socioeconomic benefits, and promoting regional peace and security' (NBI, 2015).

Next, in 2010, five upstream states signed a Cooperative Framework Agreement to extract more water from the River Nile — a move strongly opposed by Egypt and Sudan who describe the Nile as their” jewel”.

This is the root cause of the conflict along the Nile basin as upstream countries such as Egypt and Sudan oppose the growing mutiny from other riparians. Egypt, who suffer from extreme desert heat rely heavily on the Nile’s upstream water for irrigation and basic needs. Sudan, who experience mass water loss through evapotranspiration i.e. in the Sudd Swamp also are heavily dependent on the Nile. As downstream countries’ voices are slowly beginning to be heard on issues surrounding the basin it was left to the likes of Ethiopia to set the precedence and begin developmental projects for a sustainable future.

In part II of this case study I will be delving deeper into how well the 11 countries on the Nile river basin are cooperating for a sustainable future and also evaluate the current and future success of dam projects for upstream and downstream counterparts – namely the Grand Renaissance Dam.

In summation, the development of southern countries in the basin plus a pressing need to address a growing water and food scarcity problem looks to have shifted the basin’s power dynamics both upstream and southwards (Gebreluel, 2014).


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